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AN ANALYSIS OF DIVISIONAL
INVESTMENT POLICIES
This paper investigates the divisional investment policies of diversified firms. We find
that investment of the smallest division of diversified firms is significantly related to the cash
flow of the other segments. We then show that the smallest division’s investment is more
sensitive to the cash flow of the other divisions for firms where one expects aggregate investment
to be related to cash flow also, namely low q firms and firms with high leverage. This and other
evidence we provide is consistent with what we call the bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis. This
hypothesis states that relative allocations of investment funds in diversified firms are sticky. We
fail to find support for the view that diversified firms allocate more funds to divisions in
industries with better investment opportunities.
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Does it matter for a division’s investment policy whether it is pad of a highly
diversified firm, a moderately diversified firm, or is a stand-alone firm? The view that
diversification creates value is often based on the idea that being part of a diversified
firm makes it possible for a division to invest without the impediments from capital
market imperfections. q We call this the efficient internal capital markets hypothesis.
The alternative view that diversified firms invest less efficiently is generally associated
with the proposition that, because of their additional layers of management, they find it
difficult to take advantage of good investment opportunities at the division level and fail
to decrease aggressively investment in divisions that have poor investment
opportunities. We call this hypothesis the bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis. In this paper,
we first show that divisions of diversified firms invest differently than otherwise
comparable stand-alone firms and then explore why this is so.
Even though the various views of diversified firms lead to the conclusion that
investment differs between a division of a diversified firm and an otherwise comparable
stand-alone firm, there is little evidence on how investment policies differ between
diversified firms and specialized firms. Most of the evidence on the investment policies
of diversified firms is indirect and demonstrates that diversified firms are valued less
than comparable portfolios of specialized firms,2 One exception is Lament (1996), who
reports that diversified oil companies reduced investment in non-oil divisions when they
faced decreased oil revenues. Lament’s (1996) evidence shows that division-level
investment of diversified oil companies depends on other variables than the investment
1 See, for instance, Williamson (1975). Stein (1996) provides a model where
diversification increases efficiency of firms that are liquidity-constrained because
management allocates more funds to the more efficient divisions.
2See, for instance, Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell
Stulz (1994).
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(1995) and Lang andof comparable single-segment firms, but his research is not focused on trying to
understand how investment in diversified firms is different, but rather to provide
evidence on the existence of liquidity constraints.
The literature on investment policy at the firm level has documented a strong
relation between a firm’s investment and its cash flow.3 One explanation for this result
is that external finance is expensive relative to internal finance. This can be because of
information asymmetries and/or because of agency costs. With this explanation, firms
that find it most expensive to access outside funds finance investment mostly through
their cash flow. Diversification breaks the link between a division’s cash flow and its
investment even if the firm finds outside funds expensive. A diversified firm can use the
cash flow from one division to finance investment in another division. We therefore
investigate first whether the link between a division’s
weaker than the link between a firm’s cash flow and its
cash flow and its investment
investment and whether there
is
is
a relation between the investment of a division and the cash flow of other divisions.
Finding such a relation would be evidence that the internal capital market plays an
important role in diversified firms.
In our investigation, we consider separately small and large divisions. The
largest division of a firm should have an investment policy fairly similar to the
investment policy of a stand-alone firm since it typically represents a large part of the
diversified firm. In contrast, we would expect the investment of the smallest division to
be less related to its own cash flow than it would be if the division was a stand-alone
firm, We find strong evidence supportive of this view. Investment of the smallest
division does not depend on the smallest division’s cash flow when the firm is highly
3This literature is reviewed in Bernanke, Gertner and Gilchrist (1994) and Hubbard
(1995). Kaplan and Zingales (1995) provide a critical perspective on this literature.
2diversified, but depends significantly on the cash flow of the other divisions. In other
words, if the other segments have unexpectedly high cash flow, this increases the
investment of a small segment more than if that small segment itself has an
unexpectedly high cash flow. In contrast, the investment of the largest division depends
significantly on its cash flow and seems unaffected by the cash flow of the other
divisions.
Establishing that the investment of small divisions depends significantly on the
cash flow of other divisions shows that the internal capital market of diversified firms is
important. It does not establish whether the role of this capital market is positive or
negative. We then show, however, that a division in a diversified firm may invest less
than its industry because the other divisions are doing poorly or more because its other
divisions are doing well. Such evidence suggests that the internal capital market can
lead firms to underinvest or overinvest because of the performance of other divisions.
We explore three hypotheses of the investment policies of diversified firms and
investigate to which extent they can explain such results:
1. The bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis. It is often argued that diversified
firms are inefficient because the added layers of management make them
unresponsive to new investment opportunities at the division level. This argument
suggests that intra-firm capital allocations are sticky, in that each division’s fraction of
the capital budget is insensitive to its investment opportunities. If a firm’s aggregate
cash flow is an important determinant of its capital budget, there should be a relation
between a division’s investment and the firm’s cash flow irrespective of why there is a
relation between aggregate cash flow and the capital budget. Consequently, a
division’s investment is related to the cash flow of other divisions. With this hypothesis,
3one would expect the relation between a division’s investment and other divisions’ cash
flow to be weak for those firms where one does not expect investment to be sensitive to
cash flow. Firms with low leverage and/or highly valued investment opportunities can
borrow at low cost, so that one would not expect their investment to be as sensitive to
cash flow as the investment of highly levered firms and firms with poor investment
opportunities. We find that the dependence of a division’s investment on the cash flow
of other divisions is much weaker for firms with valuable investment opportunities
and/or low leverage. Presumably, bureaucratic rigidity would become more of an issue
as the firm’s degree of diversification grows. Consequently, we would expect that the
cash flow of other divisions should become a more important determinant of a division’s
investment as the number of segments increases. We find that it is indeed so.
2. The efficient internal capital market hypothesis. If management wants the
firm to grow or if it pursues positive net present value projects, one would expect it to
grow divisions that have good investment opportunities and shrink divisions that have
poor investment opportunities. If outside funds are expensive because the firm is highly
levered and/or has poor investment opportunities, the firm relies mostly on its cash flow
to finance investment and one would expect the other divisions to benefit if the largest
division has poor investment opportunities but large cash flow. The smallest division
should grow especially if it is in an industry that has good growth opportunities. We split
the sample according to above-median and below-median investment opportunities and
cash flow of the largest segment. We fail to find evidence supportive of the view that
the firm directs more resources towards its smallest division if it is in an industry with
good growth opportunities.
43. The free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis
implies that firms overinvest rather than pay out cash flows to investors. If a firm’s core
business has poor growth opportunities, management will seek growth opportunities
through diversification. One would therefore expect management to grow the smallest
division if the firm’s core business has poor growth opportunities but generates cash
flow that can be re-invested. This behavior relies on the existence of an internal capital
market, With the free cash flow hypothesis, shareholders may well be better off with
diversification than without. If management could not diversify, it might invest more in
the core business that has poorer investment opportunities than other segments! The
direct prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis is that the firm will invest more in non-
core segments if its core business has poor gro~h opportunities but generates cash
flow that can be invested. We find that investment of the smallest segment depends
more on the cash flow of the other segments when the firm has a low q, which is
consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis but also with the bureaucracy rigidity
hypothesis. To provide more support for the free cash flow hypothesis, we should also
find that the smallest segment grows more (less) when the largest division has high
(low) cash flow and poor (good) growth opportunities. We find that the investment of
the smallest segment does not depend on the cash flow of the other segments when
the largest segment has good growth opportunities and low cash flow. However, we fail
to find convincing evidence that the smallest segment grows more when the largest
segment has poor growth opportunities but high cash flow.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our data. In section 3,
we investigate the relation between investment of the smallest (largest) division and
cash flow of the largest (smallest) division and show that our results are not explained
5by mismeasurement. In section 4, we investigate the bureaucratic rigidity, the efficient
internal capital market, and the free cash flow hypotheses. We conclude in section 5.
Section 2. The data.
All our data comes from COMPUSTAT. The Business Information file of
COMPUSTAT provides information for firms disaggregated for up to 10 different
industry segments, FASB-SFAS No. 14 and SEC Regulation S-K require firms to report
segment information for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1977. SFAS No. 14
defines an industry segment as “A component of an enterprise engaged in providing a
product or service, or a group of related products or services primarily to unaffiliated
customers (i.e., customers outside the enterprise) for a profit.” Firms must report
information for segments that represent 10% or more of the consolidated sales. The
files have information available for some firms for 1976 and 1977, though firms did not
have to report for these years if their fiscal year ends December 15 or earlier. The files
contain 110,238 segment-year records for the period from 1976 to 1992. We do not
use the 1976 and 1977 years since reporting for these years is not uniform. Since we
use lagged variables in our regressions, omitting 1976 and 1977 means that we can
report results for investment from 1980 onwards, From 1980 on, we have 96,228
segment-years, For our analysis, we use the active and research files of COMPUSTAT,
so that our sample includes the firms that were subsequently delisted from
COMPUSTAT because of mergers, bankruptcies, liquidations, and so on.
Compared to the other databases used in the literature, the one used here has
both strengths and weaknesses. In an earlier study measuring the degree of diversifica-
tion of firms, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use data from the 1975 Line of Business
6sample of the Federal Trade Commission. To construct this sample, the FTC collected
sales and other financial variables from 471 large corporations. The data classify sales
using 262 manufactured product categories, but allows firms to aggregate sales from
different categories into one in cases where sales in one category are small. Wernerfelt
and Montgome~ (1988), Lichtenberg (1992) and Liebeskind and Opler (1992) use
census data on plants and measured diversification in terms of numbers of different
SIC codes for plants. Lichtenberg (1992) also uses the Compustat SIC File, which
reports up to 90 SIC codes per company. More recently, Berger and Ofek (1995),
Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) use the same database we do.
For this study, none of the alternative databases would be suitable because they do not
provide time series of investment, However, the COMPUSTAT database reports
information for up to ten segments only, does not have private firms and, as argued by
Lichtenberg (1991) and others, is subject to possible reporting biases.
For each segment, we collect six variables: net sales, operating profit (loss),
depreciation, capital expenditures, identifiable total assets, and SIC code. We exclude
segments which do not contain complete information on these variables. Doing so
reduces the sample to 52,700 segment-years. Throughout the paper, we focus on the
largest and smallest divisions. This yields 35,488 segment-years corresponding to
17,744 firm-years. An important difficulty in using this data is that firms reorganize their
segments over time. To prevent such reorganizations from affecting our conclusions,
we eliminate segment-years where any of the five ratios used in our analysis exceeds
one. The ratios are the current and lagged value of net capital expenditures over the
previous yeat’s total assets, sales change over the previous yeat’s sales, cash flow to
total assets, and finally, other segments’ cash flow divided by total assets of these
segments. Cash flow is defined as operating profit (loss) plus depreciation. The ratios
7we use are dictated to us by data availability. After excluding outliers, we end up with
16,476 firm-year records corresponding to 3,000 different firms.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our dataset. In panel A, we report the
number of firms each year per number of segments. The number of firms exceeds 900
each year. Throughout the paper, we emphasize results for the largest and the smallest
divisions of each firm. Consequently, in table 1, we provide the means and medians of
the ratios we use in the paper for both the largest and smallest divisions. Note that the
number of segments falls over time. Although some of that fall may be due to changes
in reporting practices, most of it is due to the decrease of firm-level diversification
during the 1980s. Evidence consistent with this interpretation is that studies using
different databases document a decrease in diversification also.4
The table does not indicate the industry of the segments. The SIC code of the
largest segment is also generally the main SIC code of a firm. Consequently, the SIC
code distribution of the largest segment is similar to the main SIC code distribution of
the Compustat files, The one-digit SIC code with the largest number of smallest
segments is 3 which has 5,794 smallest segment-years. That SIC code has more than
twice the number of segment-years than the SIC code with the next largest number of
smallest segments, which is code 2, That code has 2,414 segment-years. The other
SIC codes have between 1,000 and 2,000 smallest segment-years except for SIC code
1 which has only 523 smallest segment-years. Since we are trying to understand the
investment policies of diversified firms, it is important for us to include segments from
all one digit SIC codes. For instance, it could be that firms diversify away from their one
4 Liebeskind and Opler (1994) use the Trinet database and document a decrease in
firm diversification also.
8Table 1. Descriptive statistics for initial sample dataset.
All data comes from the Business Information file of COMPUSTAT. We use all firms
from 1980 to 1992 for which we can compute the ratios that are used in our investmen
equations. Panel A report the number of firms each year per number of segments
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531 459 308 152 63 27 16
516 422 290 144 60 25 11
526 422 292 133 57 23 11
477 418 273 120 38 19 9
436 391 232 100 34 17 6
471 352 212 81 36 15 6
432 350 211 80 36 12 7
431 336 192 82 33 18 4
427 335 193 72 36 19 6
449 342 192 75 45 19 5























92 365 285 172 69 30 8 3 2 3 937
Total 6071 4956 3100 1351 576 244 101 36 41 16476
Panel B,
other
net capital net capital own segment’s segments’
expenditure/ expenditure/ sales changel cash flow/ own cash flow]
own segment’s own segment’s net sales segment’s other
assets assets assets segmenls’
assets
Mean 0.03 0,04 0.07 0.17 0.17
99% 0.44 0,49 0.82 0.72 0.62
95“/0 0.19 0,22 0,51 0.47 0.41
90”/0 0.12 0,13 0.36 0.37 0.33
Median 0.01 0,01 0.07 0.16 0.16
10“/0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.20 0.00 0.03
5yo -0,05 -0.05 -0.34 -0,08 -0.02
170 -0,14 -0.12 -0.72 -0,37 -0.25
9digit SIC code, so that we might miss this if we focused on only a few one digit SIC
codes.
Section 3. Investment policies of the smallest and largest segments.
In table 2, we report estimates of investment equations for the smallest and
largest segments. Although we do not report these regressions in the paper, we also
estimated all our regressions excluding the smallest segment when its assets represent
more than 20% of the firm’s total assets. None of our conclusions are affected by using
such a threshold. In the equations of table 2, we regress the ratio of net capital
expenditures in period t+l to the segment’s assets at the end of period t on (a) the
lagged value of that ratio, (b) the growth in sales of the segment from period t-1 to t, (c)
the segment’s cash flow in t normalized by the segment’s total assets at the end of
period t, and (d) the sum of the cash flows of the other segments in t normalized by the
sum of their assets at the end of period t. We cannot use a Tobin’s q proxy for the
segment as an explanatory variable because no data is available to construct it. Since
the sample period we use corresponds to years that differ in tax regimes and stages of
the business cycle, we add a dummy variable for each year to the regression. We do
not report these dummy variables in the tables. All regressions in the paper use White’s
adjustment for heteroskedasticity. In some of the regressions reported later, we also
control for industry,
Panel A uses all the firms in our sample. In all four regressions reported in that
panel, the most significant variable is the lagged value of the dependent variable. We
find that if we use all the firms that have at least two segments, all variables are
significant and have a positive coefficient, including the other segments’ cash flow.
10However, when we restrict the sample to the firms that have five segments or more, the
results differ substantially between small and large segments. For the smallest
segment, neither past growth in sales nor the segment’s cash flow are significant, but
other segments’ cash flow has a positive significant coefficient. Looking at the size of
the coefficients, the coefficient on other segments’ cash flow is twice as large as the
coefficient on the segment’s cash flow. From this regression, there is no evidence that
proxies for the segment’s performance or investment opportunity set such as growth of
sales or cash flow matter for the segment’s capital expenditures. In contrast, for the
largest segment of firms with five segments or more, the coefficient on other cash flows
is not significant and its point estimate shows no economic significance. The coefficient
on the segment’s own cash flow is more than three times the size of the coefficient on
the segment’s cash flow in the comparable regression for the smallest segment and
has a t-statistic of 4,30.
The sample used to obtain panel A includes many small firms, so it could be
argued that these firms are not informative for the investment policies of the large
diversified firms which are the focus of most analyses of the benefits and costs of
diversification. It is also possible that the data is not as reliable for these firms. This
could be especially the case for data on the smallest segment of small firms. We
therefore restrict our sample in the following to firms with sales of at least one billion
dollars in 1977 dollars each year in which they enter the sample. This insures that the
smallest segment is fairly large. The book value of the assets of the smallest segment
has a mean of $970 million and a median of $339 million. This contrasts with the book
value of the assets of the largest segment which has a mean of $4,411 million and a
median of $1,633 million. This sample has many fewer observations than the sample of
panel A, The estimated equations are reported in panel B of table 2. For the firms with
11Table 2. Estimates of investment equations for small and large segments.
PaneI A uses all the firms in our sample from 1980 to 1992 for which we can compute th~
ratios used in our regressions. Panel B uses only the firms in the sample of panel A with sales
~f at least one billion dollars in 1977 dollars each year in which they enter the sample. Tc
Identify the timing of the observation of the variables, we use periods 1, 0 and -1. Th~
jependent variable is the segment’s net capital expenditures in period 1 divided by the book
~alue of the segment’s assets at the end of period 0, t-statistics are in parentheses.
oanel A. All firms.
For the smallest segmentsonly
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / OM
segment’sassets(-1)
0.3667 (24.88) 0,2906 (6.48)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0130 (3.96) 0.0068 (0.76)




0.0205 (3,65) 0.0444 (2.52)
Adj-R-sq 0.19 0.13
Ohs, 16476 2349
~anel B. Firms with sales above $1 billion in 1977 dollars.
For the largest segments only
2 or more 5 or more
0.4064 (21.78) 0.5073 (10.39)
0,0181 (4.78) 0.0175 (1.52)
0.0467 (8.98) 0.0654 (4.30)




2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure(0) / OM
segment’sassets(-1)
0.3951 (8.81) 0.2985 (3.87)
sales change(0)/ netsales (-1) 0.0139 (2.13) 0.0187 (1.50)
‘M ‘egrnent s Cashf’ow‘0) ‘ ‘m 0,0416 (5.34) 0.0201 (1.36)
segments assets (0)
other segment’s cashflow (0) /
other segment’s assets (0)
0.0426 (3.94) 0,0645 (2.39)
Adj-R-sq 0,24 0.18
Obs 3329 1084
For the largest segments only
2 or more 5 or more
0.5601 (9.67) 0.5445 (8.09)
0,0114 (1.86) 0.0206 (1.98)
0,0653 (6.04) 0,0731 (5.84)
0,0141 (1.30) -0.0059 (-0.29)
0.39 0.45
3329 1084
12five segments or more, there is no difference worth reporting between the two panels.
For the firms with two segments or more, the main difference between the two panels is
that now other segments’ cash flow is no longer significant for the largest segment.
Hence, for large firms, the differences between the investment policies of the smallest
and largest segments seem magnified: the largest segment does not seem to invest
more when the other segments do well, in contrast to the smallest segment.
The sample in table 2 contains firms whose segments are in similar industries
as well as firms whose segments are in quite different industries. It could be, therefore,
that other segments’ cash flow is significant in our regressions simply because it
happens that for the smallest segment the firm has other, larger segments, in very
similar industries, In this case, other segments’ cash flow might be a better proxy for the
smallest segments’ investment opportunities because the larger other segment in a
closely related industry might have more stable cash flows. We therefore estimate the
regressions of table 2 using as other segments’ cash flows only the segments that have
different 2-digit SIC codes from the smallest segment. These regressions are
reproduced in table 3. The results of table 3 are similar to those of table 2. Therefore, it
is difficult to argue that our results are due to a lack of diversification within firms
because other segments are somehow too similar to the smallest segment. The
approach used here does not allow us to take into account vertical integration,
however.
The results shown so far make no adjustment for industries. Taking into account
the industry in which a segment operates allows us to investigate whether a segment’s
investment relative to its industry is greater or smaller depending on how the other
segments of the diversified firm are doing. In the regressions reported in table 4, we
subtract the industry median from all variables except other segments’ cash flow.
13Table 3. Estimates of investment equations using as other segments’ cash flows only
those that have different 2-digit SIC codes from the smallest segment.
The sample comprises all firms with sales of at least $1 billion in 1977 dollars for which th~
~ariables could be computed using the Compustat Business Information files excluding 197t
and 1977 and excluding the firms where one or more of the accounting ratios used in the
‘egressions exceed one. To identify the timing of the observation of the variables, we use
)eriods 1, 0 and -1. The dependent variable is the segment’s net capital expenditures ir
)eriod 1 divided by the book value of the segment’s assets at the end of period O. t-statistics
are in parentheses,
For the smallest segments only
2 or more 5 or more
For the largest segments only
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1)
own segment’s cash flow (0) /
own segment’s assets (0)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /















0.5461 (8.89) 0,5426 (8.01)
0.0102 (1,56) 0.0208 (1.95)
0.0681 (5,93) 0,0744 (5.74)




Table 4. Estimates of industry-adjusted investment equations.
The sample comprises all firms with sales of at least $1 billion in 1977 dollars for which th~
~ariables could be computed using the Compustat Business Information files excluding 197f
and 1977 and excluding the firms where one or more of the accounting ratios used in th~
‘egressions exceed one. The industry median is subtracted from all variables except othel
segments’ cash flows. Industry is defined by the 2-digit SIC code. To identify the timing of the
~bservation of the variables, we use periods 1, 0 and -1. The dependent variable is the
Segment’s net capital expenditures in period 1 divided by the book value of the segment’s
assets at the end of period O. t-statistics are in parentheses.
For the smallest segments only
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
0.3694 (8,46) 0.2977 (3.75)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0094 (1,54) 0.0096 (0.85)
OM segment’s cash flow (0) /
own segment’s assets (0)
0.0397 (5.30) 0,0126 (0.90)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /
other segment’s assets (0)
0.0482 (4.47) 0.0721 (2.64)
Adj-R-sq 0.19 0,13
Ohs, 3328 1083
For the largest segments only
2 or more 5 or more
0.5216 (8.88) 0.5482 (7.86)
0,0045 (0.56) 0.0134 (1.00)
0.0559 (4,59) 0.0438 (2.72)
0.0220 (2,05) -0.0010 (0.05)
0.30 0,37
3329 1084
15Industry is defined by the 2-digit SIC code. The results reported in table 4 are similar to
those reported in the earlier tables, but have a slightly different interpretation. These
results indicate that the smallest segment invests more relative to its indust~ when the
firm’s other segments perform better. These results bear on the issue of the efficiency
of investment within diversified firms. For firms with five segments or more, it is
apparent that whether the smallest segment in the diversified firm outperforms or
underperforms its industry, this has no implication for the segment’s ability to invest.
Although our results are supportive of the view that the multi-division firm plays an
active role in transferring cash flows from some divisions to others, it is not at all clear
that this activity is beneficial. In the next section, we therefore investigate three
alternative hypotheses of the investment policies of diversified firms and examine
whether they can explain our evidence.
How robust is the result that the investment of small divisions in diversified firms
depends on the cash flow of other divisions? To examine the robustness of this result,
we estimated alternative specifications of the regressions of table 2, used different
sample periods, and finally estimated the regressions using samples restricted to one
digit SIC codes, We discuss all these estimates in the remainder of this section but do
not report them in tables since there are so many of them.
The first alternative specifications of the regressions in table 2 we considered
had contemporaneous rather than lagged cash flows and both contemporaneous and
lagged cash. These alternative specifications lead to the same qualitative conclusions
as the regressions in table 2. If we do not control for past investment and past sales
growth as a way to take into account division-specific effects, the coefficient on other
cash flow is much larger than the coefficient on own cash flow. However, the coefficient
on other cash flow is only significant using a one-tailed test whereas the coefficient on
16own cash flow is both economically and statistically negligible. We also estimated the
regressions using gross investment as the dependent variable. This seems to increase
the coefficient of own cash flow as well as the coefficient of cash flow of other
segments.
Table 2 provides estimates using levels of variables rather than difference
variables. We investigated difference versions of the specification in table 2. For the
whole sample, we find a strong effect of the contemporaneous change in other
divisions’ cash flow on the change in investment. The coefficient on the change in other
divisions’ cash flow is 0.0714 with a t-statistic of 2.61. There is no positive significant
effect of the change in own cash flow on investment. When we focus on firms with five
segments or more, neither the change in own cash flow nor the change in other cash
flows is significant. The coefficient on other cash flows is 0.0403 with at t-statistic of
0,96. The coefficient on own cash flow is -0,0090 with a t-statistic of 0.32. The problem
seems to be one of power. Differencing reduces the number of observations. If we
consider firms with four segments or more, we almost double the number of
observations. For these firms, the coefficient on changes in other segments’ cash flow
is 0.0908 with a t-statistic of 2.17, In contrast, the coefficient on own cash flow is
negative and insignificant.
The investment regressions reported seem stable through time, but their
significance falls some as the sample is divided in two equal subsamples. We
estimated the regressions of table 2 over two subperiods: 1980-1985 and 1986-1992.
In those regressions, other cash flow is never significant for the largest segment but is
significant at least at the 0,10 level for the smallest segment. Further, own cash flow is
always highly significant for the largest segment but is not significant for the smallest
segment if it belongs to a firm with five segments or more. Somewhat surprisingly, the
17explanatory power of the regressions is much lower for the smallest segment in the
second subperiod. In particular, the R2 of the smallest segment regression when the
smallest segment belongs to a firm with five segments or more is only 0.06 for the
second subperiod, which is much lower than the value of 0.22 for the first subperiod.
Rather than dividing the sample into two subperiods, we also estimated the regressions
of table 2 year by year, Doing so, the sample size falls dramatically. Nevertheless, for 9
years out of 14, the coefficient on other cash flows for the firms with five segments or
more exceeds the coefficient on own cash flow for the smallest segment. [n addition,
the coefficient on own cash flow is never significant but the coefficient on other cash
flows is significant for four years at the 0.10 level for a two-tailed test.
We finally considered the issue of whether our results are industry-specific or
induced by vertical integration. We estimated our regressions restricting the sample
each time to all firms in a one digit SIC code. When we do that, the sample sizes
become quite small. We therefore estimated our equations first using all firms rather
than only the large firms. When we did that, the coefficient on other cash flows for firms
with two or more segments is significant for the smallest segment for SIC codes 2, 3, 4
and 6. When we consider only the large firms, the same coefficient is significant for the
SIC codes 1, 2, 4 and 6.
Section 4. What determines the allocation of funds within the multi-division firm?
So far, we have seen that the smallest division of a multi-division firm invests
more when the other divisions have high cash flow, but the investment of the largest
division seems insensitive to the cash flow of the other divisions. In this section, we
18attempt to understand whether the evidence is consistent with the bureaucratic rigidity
hypothesis, the efficient internal capital market, or the free cash flow hypothesis.
There is considerable evidence on the relation between cash flow and
investment. Though it is not clear why this relation exists, there is enough evidence at
this point to conclude that this relation is not explained by cash flow acting as a proxy
for investment opportunities. In this paper, we do not focus on understanding the
relation between cash flow and investment better. Rather, we take this relation as
given and use it to investigate the bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis.
It is commonly observed that firms that cut capital expenditures tend to do so
through across-the-board cuts in investment budgets. This suggests that the share of
the aggregate investment budget accruing to each division is sticky but the size of the
investment budget is not. If firms maintain some relation between the size of the
investment budget and cash flow, one would then observe a relation between
investment at the division level and the firm’s cash flow. For small divisions, this implies
a relation between the division’s investment and the cash flow of other divisions. For
large divisions, this relation should exist too. However, the coefficient of other cash flow
in the investment equation should be inversely related to the size of the division relative
to the firm’s size. Hence, this suggests a small coefficient on other cash flow for the
large division and a large coefficient on other cash flow for the smallest division. At the
same time, one would expect the coefficient on own cash flow to be increasing in the
relative size of the division. Our evidence is consistent with these implications of the
bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis.
One would expect the relation between cash flow and investment to be less
tight for firms that have substantial borrowing capacity. If the relation between cash flow
and investment is driven by the cost of external funds, firms with substantial borrowing
19capacity have a lower cost of external funds. One would therefore expect the relation
between investment and other cash flow to be much weaker for firms with high debt
capacity. To investigate this hypothesis, we divide the sample between firms that have
above-median leverage and firms that have below-median leverage.5 Leverage is
defined as total debt divided by total assets. One would expect other cash flow to be
less important for firms with below-median leverage. Table 5 reports the results of
regressions for firms with below-median leverage in panel A and for firms with above-
median leverage in panel B. The results are supportive of our hypothesis. In firms with
below-median leverage, the cash flow of other segments has no significant impact on
the investment of the smallest segment, In contrast, for the firms with above-median
leverage, the coefficient on cash flow of other segments for the investment equation of
the smallest segment is significant for both the whole sample and for the sample of
firms with at least five divisions. For the largest division, the coefficient of the cash flow
of other segments is negative but insignificant for the low leverage firms with two
segments or more and negative and significant, at the 0.10 level, for low leverage firms
with five segments or more. In contrast, for the high leverage firms, the coefficient on
other segments’ cash flow is positive and marginally significant for the firms with two
segments or more and is positive but insignificant for the firms with five segments or
more. Hence, for highly levered firms, there is weak evidence that even the investment
of the largest division depends on the cash flow of the other divisions.
Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1995) show that leverage does not appear to impede the
growth of firms with valuable investment opportunities. In their paper, investment
opportunities are measured by a proxy for Tobin’s q. Hence, one would expect that the
5In the following, whenever we split the sample according to a firm characteristic, we do
so on a yearly basis to avoid having a situation where all the firms in a subsample
come from the same subperiod.
20Table 5. Estimates of investment equations for high and low leverage firms.
The sample comprises all firms with sales of at least $1 billion in 1977 dollars for which th[
variables could be computed using the Compustat Business Information files excluding 197[
and 1977 and excluding the firms where one or more of the accounting ratios used in th[
regressions exceed one. Leverage is defined as the book value of total debt divided by th[
book value of total assets. Panel A reports estimates of investment equations for firms witl
below-median leverage. Panel B reports estimates of investment equations for firms witl
above-median leverage. To identify the timing of the observation of the variables, we us
periods 1, 0 and -1. The dependent variable is the segment’s net capital expenditures i[
period 1 divided by the book value of the segment’s assets at the end of period O. t-statistic:
are in parentheses.
Panel A. Firms with below-median leverage
the smallest segments only the largest segments only
2 or more 5 or more 2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
0.4047 (8.60) 0.3000 (4.21) 0,5433 (8.01) 0.6272 (8.01 )
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0123 (1.52) -0.0040 (-0.29) 0.0301 (3.31) 0.0360 (2.23)
own segment’s cash flow (0) /
own segment’s assets (0)
0.0261 (2,50) 0.0034 (0.19) 0.0681 (4.14) 0.0410 (2.57)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /
other segment’s assets (0)
0,0208 (1.39) 0,0472 (1.08) -0.0018 (0.10) -0.0485 (-1.81)
Adj-R-sq 0.22 0,13 0.33 0,58
Ohs. 1634 467 1634 467
Panel B, Firms with above-median leverage.
the smallest segmentsonly the largest segments only
2 or more 5 or more 2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’sassets(-1)
0.3796 (5.42) 0.2963 (2.33) 0.5690 (6.43) 0.4505 (4.63)
sales change (0)/ net sales (-1) 0,0140 (1.47) 0.0331 (1.76) -0.0031 (0.36) 0.0134 (1.01)
‘Wn ‘egrnent’s Cashf’ow‘0) ‘ ‘w 0.0607 (4.76) 0.0279 (1.19) segments assets(0) 0.0567 (4.40) 0.0955 (5.17)
other segment’s=shflow (0) /
other segment’sassets(0) 0.0771 (3.75) 0.0668 (1,80) 0.0256 (1.M) 0.0254 (0.73)
Adj-R-sq 0.26 0.21 0,44 0.36
Ohs. 1636 609 1636 609
21relation between other cash flows and investment should be weak for firms with good
investment opportunities. In table 6, we divide the sample of high and low leverage
firms further according to whether our measure of Tobin’s q is above the median or
below the median. We use the firm’s market value divided by its book value as a
measure of Tobin’s q (as in Smith and Watts (1992), the precise definition is the ratio of
the market value of shares outstanding plus total assets minus book equity and the
book value of total assets). We would expect the coefficient on other cash flows to be
weakest for firms with low leverage and a high q and to be strongest for the firms with
high leverage and a low q. We find in panel A of table 6 that for high q firms, the cash
flow of other segments does not have a significant positive coefficient for the smallest
or the largest segment, whether the firm is highly diversified or not, and whether it has
high leverage or not. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the cash flow of other segments
has a significant negative coefficient for the largest segment, suggesting that as the
other segments do better, the firm effectively imposes a tax on the largest segment.
PaneI B reports results for low q firms, For these firms, the cash flow of other segments
has a significant coefficient in the regression for the smallest segment when the firm
has at least two divisions whether the firm has high or low leverage. When we turn to
the firms with five divisions or more in panel B, the same coefficient has a t-statistic of
2.14 for the firms with low leverage and a t-statistic of 1.30 for the firms with high
leverage. It is useful to note, however, that the coefficient on other segments’ cash flow
for the low q firms with above-median leverage, 0.0708, is about the same as the
coefficient on the same variable in table 5 for firms with above-median leverage,
0.0668, It seems, therefore, that for low q firms the coefficient on other segments’ cash
flow is large and not significantly different for low leverage low q firms and high
leverage low q firms. This suggests that investment opportunities play an important role
22Table 6. Estimates of investment equations for high and low Q firms for firms with high
and low leverage.
Panel A reports estimates of investment equations for firms with above-median market-to-
book ratio. Panel B reports estimates of investment equations for firms with below-median
market-to-book ratio. To identify the timing of the observation of the variables, we use periods
1, 0 and -1. The dependent variable is the segment’s net capital expenditures in period 1
divided by the book value of the segment’s assets at the end of period O. t-statistics are in
parentheses.
Panel A. High Q firms.
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets(-1)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1)
own segment’s cashflow (0) /
own segment’s assets(0)
other segments’cash flow (0) /
other segments’ assets (0)
Adj-R-sq
Ohs.
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets(-1)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1)
ownsegment’s cash flow (0)/
ownsegment’s assets(0)




For smallest segments For largest segments
Firms with below-mdian leverage Firms with belowmecfian leverage
2 or more 5 or more 2 or more 5 or more
0.5523 (9.79) 0.4762 (6.56)
0,0068 (0,70) 0.0199 (1.12)
0.0269 (1.83) 0.0176 (0.66)




Firms with above-median Ieveraae
2 or more 5 or more
0.3927 (5.09) 0.5182 (5.33)
0.0110 (0.96) 0.0168 (1.02)
0.0611 (3.58) -0.0195 (0.61)
0.0322 (1.12) 0.0275 (0.38)
0.23 0.33
750 231
0.4613 (4.05) 0.5911 (6.30)
0.0535 (3.51) 0.0697 (3.23)
0.0651 (2.45) 0.0073 (0.35)




Firms with ahve-median leverage
2 or more 5 or more
0.5563 (5.16) 0.5334 (5.53)
0.0081 (0.57) 0,0142 (0.75)
0.0388 (2.35) 0.M16 (1.82)
0.0253 (1.04) -0.0118 (0.24)
0,37 0.34
750 231
(Table is continued on the next Daae)
23Table 6. (continued)
Panel B. Low Q firms.
For smallest segments
Firms tith belowmedian leverage
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
0.3319 (5.74) 0,2870 (3.03)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0103 (0.84) -0.0162 (0.83)
:::::t~::s:;sa~~;ow ‘0) ‘ ‘Wn 0.0136 (0.84) 0.0005 (0,02)
other segments’ cashflow (0)/
other segm ent’s assets (0)




Firms tith above-median leverage
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
0.3326 (2.29) 0.0950 (0.50)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0247 (1.64) 0.0457 (2.00)
own segment’s cashflow (0) / own
segment’s assets (0)
0.0556 (2,84) 0.0605 (1.67)
other segments’ cashflow (0) /
other segments’ assets (0)





2 or more 5 or more
0,5120 (6.07) 0.4742 (3.84)
0.0179 (1.11) -0.0006 (0.02)
0.1281 (3.86) 0.1581 (4.02)




Firms with above-median leverage
2 or more 5 or more
0.4856 (3.56) 0.6718 (6,20)
-0,0118 (1,35) -0,0119 (0.90)
0.0354 (1.67) 0.0504 (1.85)
-0.0281 (1.33) -0.0141 (0.39)
0.41 0.56
754 314
24in the relation between a division’s investment and the cash flow of other divisions
irrespective of leverage,
The results in table 6 do not distinguish between our various hypotheses. The
bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis and the efficient internal capital market hypothesis both
imply that investment of one division is more related to the cash flow of the other
divisions when aggregate investment is more related to aggregate cash flow and the
free cash flow hypothesis has no implications for this.
A firm can have an efficient internal capital market that takes resources from
cash rich divisions with poor growth opportunities and funnel these resources towards
divisions with better investment opportunities. With the free cash flow hypothesis, these
resources are put to poor use in that shareholders would be better off if these
resources were paid out to them in the form of dividends. With the Williamson version
of the efficient internal capital markets hypothesis, these funds are put to good use, in
that they fund profitable investments that would not take place in specialized firms
because of capital markets imperfections. The efficient internal capital market therefore
makes the prediction that firms with large divisions with poor growth opportunities will
reallocate funds towards smaller divisions with better investment opportunities. We
investigate this prediction in two steps. First, we address the issue of whether the
smallest division grows more when the largest division has high cash flow but poor
investment opportunities, Second, we investigate whether the smallest division receives
more funds if it has greater investment opportunities. In the first test, we use as a proxy
for the investment opportunities of the largest division the market-to-book ratio of the
whole firm, assuming that the market-to-book ratio of the whole firm mostly reflects the
investment opportunities of the largest division, In the second test, we use as a proxy
for a division’s investment opportunities the median market-to-book ratio of its industry.
25Table 7. Estimates of investment equations for high and low cash flow of largest
segment.
Samples are divided according to the median cash flow of the largest segment. Panel P
provides estimates of investment equations for the smallest segment depending on whethel
the cash flow of the largest segment is high or low. Panel B provides estimates of investmen’
squations for the largest segment, To identify the timing of the observation of the variables
Me use periods 1, 0 and -1. The dependent variable is the segment’s net capita
~xpenditures in period 1 divided by the book value of the segment’s assets at the end 01
~eriod O. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A. The smallest segments.
Below-median market to book ratio
and largest segment tith below-
median cash flow
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
0,2373 (1.66) 0,0763 (0.38)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0302 (1.97) 0.0262 (1.29)
own segment’s cash flow (0) /
own segment’s assets (0)
0.0391 (2.21) 0.0421 (1.35)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /
other segments’ assets (0)
0.0778 (2,38) 0.0755 (1,50)
Adj-R-sq 0.13 0,07
Ohs. 756 370
Above-median market to book
ratio and largest segment w’th
below-median cash flow
2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
0.3681 (4.18) 0.5607 (5,16)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0157 (1.37) O0228 (1.41)
own segments’ cash flow (0) /
own segments’ assets (0)
0.0262 (1.79) -0.0281 (-0.79)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /
other segments’ assets (0)
-0.0524 (1.92) -0.0607 (-0.88)
Adj-R-sq 0.18 0,34
Ohs. 755 225
Below-median market to book ratio
and largest segment tith abov~
mediancashflow
2 or more 5 or more
0.3866 (5.99) 0.2911 (3.11)
0.0047 (0.49) -0.0042 (-0.22)
0,0310 (1.55) 0.0325 (0,72)
0.0324 (1.24) 0.1499 (2.03)
0.28 0.18
754 208
Above-median market to bok
ratio and largest segment tith
above-median cash flow
2 or more 5 or more
0.5502 (11.65) 0.4437 (7.79)
0.0006 (0.07) 0.0063 (0.31)
0.0548 (3,45) 0.0348 (1.49)
0.0128 (0.68) 0.1004 (1.51)
0.38 0.44
749 185
(Table is continued on the next page)
26Table 7. (continued)
Panel B. The largest segments.
Below-median market to book ratio
and largest segment Wth below-
median cash flow
2 or more 5 ormore
net capital expenditure (0) / own
0.5244 (5.39) 0.5210 (4.35)
segment’s assets (-1)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1)
own segment’s cash flow (0) /
ow segment’s assets (0)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /
other segments’ assets (0)
Adj-R-sq
Ohs.
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1)
own segment’s cash flow (0) /
own segment’s assets (0)
other segments’ cash flow (0) /
other segments’ assets (0)
Adj-R-sq
Ohs.
-0,0089 (-0.75) -0.0097 (-0.47)
0.0800 (3.59) 0.1190 (3,72)
0.0050 (0.21) 0,0183 (0,36)
0.42 0.47
756 370
Above-median market to book
ratio and largest segment w“th
belowmedian cash flow
2 or more 5 or more
0.4548 (5.11) 0,5257 (4.15)
0.0156 (1,22) 0.0274 (1.47)
0.0371 (1.61) -0,0037 (-0.17)
-0.0169 (-0.54) -0,0333 (-0,77)
0.20 0.30
755 225
Below-median market to book ratio
and largest segment tith above
median cash flow
2 or more 5 or more
0.4441 (3.70) 0.5732 (8.31)
0.0199 (1.35) 0.0180 (0.96)
0.0769 (2.55) 0.0809 (3.20)
0.0325 (1,02) -0.0028 (-0.09)
0.31 0.50
754 208
Above-median market to book
ratio and largest segment tith
above-median cash flow
2 or more 5 or more
0,5844 (4.38) 0.5875 (9.21)
0.0300 (1.68) 0.0506 (2.56)
0.0551 (2.46) 0.0565 (2,70)
0.0096 (0,49) -0.0414 (-0.77)
0.44 0.58
749 185
27Table 7 provides results for the sample split according to q and according to the cash
flow of the largest division. We divide firms according tothemedian cash flow of the
largest segment. Panel A provides investment regressions for the smallest segment
depending on whether the cash flow of the largest segment is high or low. We see that
if Tobin’s q is low, the investment of the smallest segment depends positively on the
cash flow of the other segments irrespective of whether the cash flow from the largest
segment is large or small, but the coefficient on other segments’ cash flow is significant
only for the firms with two segments or more when the largest segment has below-
median cash flow and for the firms with five segments or more when the largest
segment has above-median cash flow, In contrast, when Tobin’s q is large, the cash
flow of the other segments is irrelevant if the cash flow from the largest segment is
below the sample median, However, in the case of firms with five segments or more
where the largest segment has above-median cash flow, the coefficient on other
segments’ cash flow is a surprisingly large 0,10. Panel B provides results for the largest
segment. We find there that whether the firm has a high or a low Tobin’s q, the
coefficient on other cash flow is insignificant in the largest segment regressions. In half
the cases, the regression coefficient is negative but insignificant. Interestingly, the cash
flow of the largest segment has a significant coefficient in all cases except when the
largest segment has below-median cash flow and the firm has a high q. These results
offer mixed support for the free cash flow hypothesis: other cash flows matters more for
low q firms but whether the largest segment has high or low cash flow does not seem to
matter as much as the free cash low arguments would suggest.
Though we do not report the estimates here, we also investigated regressions
for the largest and smallest segments when these segments are suffering losses. We
found a significant coefficient on other segments’ cash flow in the largest segment
28regression for firms with two or more segments but not in the regression for firms with
five or more segments. For the firms with five or more segments, the regression
coefficient is 0.069, which is large compared to the other values reported in this paper,
but the t-statistic is 1.25. This regression has only 91 observations, however, which is
the lowest sample size of regressions discussed in this paper. The coefficients on other
segments’ cash flow are 0.137 and 0.177 for the smallest segment regressions for
firms with two segments or more and firms with five segments or more, and the t-
statistics are, respectively, 3.27 and 3.06. Surprisingly, in these regressions the own-
segment cash flow has a marginally significant coefficient. This suggests that losses in
the smallest segment slow down investment in that segment. There is no evidence that
there is such an effect for the largest segment.
Our alternative approach to testing the efficient internal capital market view is to
investigate whether a division grows more if it is in an industry that has better growth
opportunities. We measure industry investment opportunities as follows. We start from
the 3-digit SIC code of a segment. If there are five or more firms which have that 3-digit
SIC code as their main SIC code, we take the median market-to-book of these five
firms. If there are less than five firms in the 3-digit SIC code, we turn to the 2-digit code.
We compute market-to-book deciles for each year in the sample. Having computed the
market-to-book deciles, we then use an interactive dummy variable
we divide industry market-to-book
indicator variables for the second,
These regressions are presented in
each year into four quartiles.
third and fourth quartiles with
in two ways. First,
We then interact
other cash flows.
panel A of Table 8. We find there that the indust~
investment opportunities have no significant effect for the second and third quartile. For
the fourth quartile, they have a negative effect that is significant for firms with five
segments or more. These results are not consistent with the efficient internal markets
29Table 8. Estimates of investment equations controlling for industry growth
opportunities
Industry growth opportunities are mesured by the median market-to-book in the division’s
Iindustry. Panel A provides estimates of investment equations for the smallest segment.
1 Dummy variable D2 takes a value of 1 if the division’s industry market to book is in 2nd
quartile of industry market to book ratios that year, and so on. Panel B provides estimates of
investment equations where the dummy variable Dm takes a value of 1 if the division’s
indust~ market to book is greater than the median industry market-to-book value in the same
year. To identify the timing of the observation of the variables, we use periods 1, 0 and -1.
The dependent variable is the segment’s net capital expenditures in period 1 divided by the
book value of the segment’s assets at the end of period O. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A. Regressions with quartile interactive dummy variables.
For smallest segments For largest segments
2 or more 5 or more 2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / own
segment’s assets (-1 )
0.3940 (8.36) 0.3285 (3.99) 0.5177 (9.06) 0.5492 (7.69)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0157 (2.13) 0.0229 (1.70) 0.0153 (2.33) 0.0184 (1 .66)
‘M ‘egrnent’s Cashf’ow ‘0) “m 0.0399 (4.75) 0.0100 (0.64)
segments assets (0)
0.0666 (5.60) 0.0737 (5.26)
other segment’s cashflow (0) /
other segment’s assets (0)
0.0446 (3.42) 0.0652 (2.07) 0.0101 (0.83) -0.0028 (-0.12)
D2*(other segment’s cashflow (0)
/ other segment’s assets (0))
-0.0115 (-0.64) -0.0352 (-1 .16) -0.0188 (-1 .22) -0.0192 (-0.76)
D3’(other segment’s cashflow (0)
/ other segment’s assets (0))
-0.0079 (-0.67) -0.0138 (-0.47) 0.0155 (1.01) -0.0382 (-1.34)
D4’(other segment’s cashflow (0)
/ other segment’s assets (0))
0,0168 (0.32) -0,2564 (-3.80) -0.0187 (-0.46) -0.1911 (-3.19)
Adj-R-sq 0.24 0.21 0.35 0.47
Ohs. 3008 988 3008 988
(Table is continued on the next page)
30Table 8. (continued)
Panel B.Regressions with median interactive dummy variables.
For smallest segments For largest segments
2 or more 5 or more 2 or more 5 or more
net capital expenditure (0) / OM
segment’s assets (-1 )
0.3944 (8.36) 0,3274 (3.94) 0.5171 (9.03) 0.5509 (7.78)
sales change (0) / net sales (-1) 0.0158 (2.13) 0.0226 (1 .67) 0.0155 (2.37) 0.0181 (1 .65)
::;::t~:::e::;)flow ‘0) ‘ ‘w 0.0396 (4.72) 0.0100 (0.64) 0.0654 (5.63) 0.0724 (5.21)
other segment’s cashflow (0) /
other segment’s assets (0)
0.0413 (3.31) 0,0568 (1.88) 0.0063 (0.52) -0.0069 (-0.31)
Dm’(other segment’s cashflow (0)
/ other segment’s assets (0))
-0.0035 (-0.30) -0.0176 (-0.66) 0.0176 (1 .20) -0.0398 (-1.42)
Adj-R-sq 0.24 0,21 0.35 0.47
Ohs. 3008 988 3008 988
31hypothesis. With that hypothesis, one would expect the coefficient on the fourth quartile
to be significantly positive. In panel B of Table 8, we estimate the same regressions
with an indicator variable for industry investment opportunities above the sample
median. It turns out that whether an industry has investment opportunities above or
below the median has no impact on how much this segment invests.
As a last piece of evidence supportive of the bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis, we
regressed the smallest segment’s net capital expenditures normalized by segment
assets on the firm’s net capital expenditures normalized by the firm’s book assets. For
firms of five segments or more, the slope of this regression is 0.5122 with a t-statistic of
6.83. The adjusted R-squared of this regression is 0.13. The investment rate of the firm
therefore explains considerably more of the variation in the investment rate of the
smallest segment than the segment’s cash flow, This suggests that the smallest
segment grows if the firm grows and stagnates otherwise.
Section 5. Conclusion.
In this paper, we explored the divisional investment policies of multi-division
firms. Most of our results are for large diversified firms, Our results can be summarized
as follows:
1, For the whole sample, the investment of the smallest division depends
significantly on the cash flow of the other divisions. In contrast, the investment of the
largest division depends on its own cash flow but not on the cash flow of the other
divisions.
322. The dependence of the smallest division’s investment on the cash flow of
other divisions exists only for firms with above-median leverage and firms with below-
median market to book ratios.
3. There is no evidence that segments in industries with better investment
opportunities receive relatively more of the firm’s cash flow.
Our evidence is consistent with the view that the investment policy of divisions
differs from the investment policy of similar stand-alone firms. Focusing on the smallest
segment, we show that its investment is driven by the cash flow generated by other
segments rather than by the prospects of its industry. The smallest segment invests
more than stand-alone firms in the industry when the other segments do well and
invests less when they do poorly. This suggests that investment in the smallest
segment can be quite inefficient, being too little at times and too large at other times.
Hence, even though our evidence is consistent with a strong role for an internal capital
market in diversified firms, it appears that this internal capital market may lead to
misallocation of resources. One hypothesis that can explain this result is that divisional
shares of a firm’s investment budget are sticky, so that when the investment budget
falls because of lower cash flows at the firm level, divisional investment falls also.
Overall, the evidence provides support for the bureaucratic rigidity hypothesis. We fail
to find evidence supportive of the hypothesis that internal capital markets allocate
funds efficiently. Our evidence is only partly consistent with the free cash flow
hypothesis, in that we do not find strong support for the view that management
expands the smallest division more when the largest division has poor investment
opportunities and high cash flow,
33References
Berger, P., and E. Ofek, 1995, Diversification’s effect on firm value, Journal of Financial
Economics 37, 39-65,
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist, 1993, The financial accelerator and the flight
to quality, Unpublished working paper (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ).
Comment, R., and G.A. Jarrell, 1995, Corporate focus and stock returns, Journal of
Financial Economics 37, 67-87.
Hubbard, R,G., 1995, Capital-market imperfections and investment, unpublished
working paper, Columbia University.
Jensen, M.C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers,
American Economic Review 76, 323-339. ‘
Kaplan, S. N., and L. Zingales, 1995, Do financing constraints explain why investment is
correlated with cash flow?, Unpublished working paper (University of Chicago,
Chicago, ILL).
Lament, O., 1996, Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital markets,
Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Lang, L.H,P., E. Ofek, and R. Stulz, 1995, Leverage, investment and growth, Journal of
Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Lang, L.H,P., and R. Stulz, 1994, Tobin’s q, corporate diversification, and firm
performance, Journal of Political Economy 102, 1248-1280.
Lichtenberg, F,R., 1991, The managerial response to regulation of financial reporting
for segments of a business enterprise, Journal of Regulatory Economics 3, 241-
249.
Lichtenberg, F.R., 1992, Industrial de-diversification and its consequences for
productivity, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 18, 427-438
Liebeskind, J., and Opler, T.C., 1992, The causes of corporate refocusing, unpublished
working paper (Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX).
Ravenscraft, D.J., and F.M. Scherer, 1987, Mergers, sell-offs, and economic efficiency,
Brookings Institute, Washington, DC,
Smith, C.W. and R. Watts, 1992, The investment opportunity set and corporate
financing, dividend and compensation policies, Journal of Financial Economics
32, 263-292.
34Stein, J.C., 1996, Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources,
Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Stulz, R.M., 1990, Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies, Journal of
Financial Economics 26, 3-27.
Wernerfelt, B., and C.A. Montgomery, 1988, Tobin’s q and the importance of focus in
firm performance, American Economic Review 78, 246-254.
Williamson, O. E., 1975, Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrus implications,
Collier McMillan Publishers, Inc. New York.
35